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*1. Introduction
1
A large body of literature documents that ￿nancial development is associated with higher
per capita incomes and a faster rate of economic growth.
2 It is also apparent that ￿nancial
systems differ markedly across the world, with some countries having highly inef￿cient
systems compared with other countries. The obvious question to ask, then, is what are the
causes of prolonged ￿nancial backwardness in some nations. Recent empirical work has
demonstrated that various dimensions of ￿nancial development, such as the breadth and depth
of ￿nancial markets, the number of IPOs, ￿rms’ access to external ￿nance, and prevailing
ownership patterns are positively correlated with the degree of legal investor protection (La
Porta et al., 1998).
3 However, even if one is ready to accept this point of view, the question
of why some countries have poor legal investor protection remains unanswered:
4 why are
laws not changed in order to increase legal investor protection? We argue that although society
would bene￿t overall from better corporate governance rules, not all the agents in the economy
would stand to gain. In particular, stronger investor protection allows the ￿nancing of new
ideas and new ￿rms which represent a threat to the pro￿ts and rents of incumbent ￿rms.
Improvements in the functioning of the ￿nancial system are less valuable for the incumbents
than they are for the potential entrants. Indeed, the former can rely on the cash ￿ow produced
by existing assets; they can use such assets as collateral; they may bene￿t from a reputation
developed over time. Therefore, the net effect of reforms aimed at improving the ￿nancial
system can be negative for them, the advantage of easier access to ￿nancing being second order
with respect to the increased threat of competition represented by new entrants in the market.
As a consequence, the incumbents will try to in￿uence the political process in the direction of
1 This is a revised version of the paper "The Political Economy of Financial Backwardness", ￿rst presented
at the second Jamboree of the European Doctoral Group in Economics (Copenhagen, 21/22 September 2002)
and of the ￿rst chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at Bocconi University. I am grateful to Alberto Alesina, Andrei
Shleifer, Guido Tabellini and expecially to Fausto Panunzi for helpful discussions and comments, and to seminar
participants at the University of Copenhagen and Bocconi University. The responsibility for all the remaining
errors is, of course, mine. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily re￿ect
those of the Bank of Italy. E-mail: pietro.tommasino@bancaditalia.it
2 See, e.g., King and Levine (1993), Jayaratna and Strahan (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998). Levine
(2005) is an up-to-date and thorough survey.
3 For the de￿nition and measurement of investor protection, see La Porta et al. (1997).
4 La Porta et al. (1997) argue that differences in legal protection are related to legal origins, but the legal
origin explanation cannot account for variations in investor protection over relatively short time spans, such as
those documented by Rajan and Zingales (2003) over the twentieth century.8
not adopting ef￿ciency-enhancing changes to the ￿nancial system (this line of reasoning has
been advanced informally by Rajan and Zingales, 2003). The attempts to block the reform
process would be ineffective if the only objective of the politicians were the maximization
of social welfare, but the political economy literature has convincingly shown that politicians
are vulnerable to the in￿uence of lobbyists and special interests. For instance (leaving aside
bribes and corruption) they care about being re-elected and re-election depends, among other
factors, on campaign contributions. Moreover, incumbents are in a better position to enter
into mutually bene￿cial agreements with the political establishment since they are currently
enjoying the rents that new entry would dissipate. We argue that, as a consequence, politicians
in many countries do not adopt the reforms because they do not want to lose the contributions
received from the incumbents.
In this paper we build a model that captures the links between legal investor protection
and the economic and political features of the insider-outsider con￿ict. More precisely, our
model has the following features: entrepreneurs need to have access to the capital markets
to ￿nance their projects, but they have different ￿nancial needs. In particular, those who are
already operating in the market can re-invest in new projects (part of) the cash ￿ow produced
by the existing assets and therefore have lower ￿nancial needs than potential entrants. There
is also moral hazard on the entrepreneur side, as we assume that the entrepreneur can divert a
fraction of the cash ￿ow as private bene￿ts of control. Investors are ready to ￿nance the project
only if they expect to break even. Thus, when the threat of expropriation by managers is very
high, they will not fund the project, even though it would be socially optimal to do so: the
project will be ￿nanced only when the entrepreneur’s ￿nancing needs are low. Legal protection
shapes the ability of entrepreneurs to appropriate corporate resources in the form of private
bene￿ts of control: namely, stronger legal protection implies that a lower fraction of corporate
resources can be diverted by the entrepreneur. As a consequence, when legal protection is
weak only ￿rich￿ entrepreneurs (i.e. entrepreneurs who have large private wealth and therefore
reduced ￿nancial needs) will be able to ￿nance their project. ￿Poor￿ entrepreneurs will remain
outside the market. Instead, better rules, by restraining the entrepreneur’s ability to divert
resources in his or her favour, give access to funds even to ￿poor￿ entrepreneurs. New entry
in the market can be socially desirable but it is certainly opposed by incumbent entrepreneurs
who would face new competitors. To stop any attempt to improve legal protection ￿rich￿
entrepreneurs (incumbents) can try to in￿uence the political process. Politicians have an9
objective function that is a mixture of social welfare and monetary transfer received from
entrepreneurs. We show that when politicians are suf￿ciently self-interested, they will not
pass policies designed to implement a stronger legal protection. In fact, incumbents have both
larger incentives to lobby the politicians than the entrants
5 and more funds to spend on such
activities. This is indeed the central result of the paper: the political process may preserve an
inef￿cient level of legal investor protection.
The paper also deals with the economic and political interactions between investor
protection and the regulation of labour: there is indeed evidence that bad investor protection
tends to go hand in hand with highly regulated labour markets (Pagano and Volpin, 2005,
Botero et al., 2005). We argue that as higher wages (and, more generally, a better bargaining
position of workers vis-￿-vis entrepreneurs) reduce the pro￿ts expected from starting a ￿rm,
worker-friendly labour laws represent for the incumbents another effective, albeit costly,
barrier to entry, to be used in circumstances in which weak investor protection is not enough to
keep potential competitors at bay. In particular, laws that favour workers (e.g. minimum wage
laws, collective bargaining rules, employment protection legislation) might reduce the share
of corporate rents accruing to the owner up to the point that post-entry pro￿ts are not enough
to grant an adequate ex ante return to lenders. Cash-poor entrepreneurs are then unable to get
funds in the ￿rst place and are consequently kept out of the market. If ￿ercer product market
competition destroys more pro￿ts than workers’ empowerment does, incumbents will push for
a weak investor protection/strong labour regime; if political institutions are weak, their efforts
will be successful. On the contrary, consistent with the empirical ￿ndings of Giavazzi and
Tabellini (2005), improvements in the political environment trigger comprehensive pro-market
reforms.
Our ￿nal step is to open up the black box of the political process. We present a model
of political competition where politicians need campaign contributions to win the vote of
uninformedvoterswhoarein￿uencedbyideology. Weshowthatahighfractionofuninformed
votersandstrongideologiesincreasesthevalueofcontributionsforpoliticiansandmakesthem
more vulnerable to lobbying pressure. Our model thus predicts that countries where voters’
5 The argument is identical to the so-called ef￿ciency effect in R&D models. The price that a monopolist
is ready to pay to acquire a patent for a new innovation is higher than the price a potential entrant would pay
whenever competition destroys total pro￿ts in the market.10
behaviour is highly in￿uenced by ideology and where the media are not credible (say, becouse
they are owned by the different lobbies) are less likely to be captured by the incumbents’ lobby.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after a short review of the related literature,
in Section 3 we study the equilibrium consequences of the degree of investor protection on the
welfare of different classes of agents. This allows us to derive their political preferences.
From Section 4 to Section 6 we study how these policy preferences are translated into a policy
outcome, under different assumptions about the mechanics of the political system. For each
institutional setting we characterize the political-economic equilibrium. In the last section we
draw some conclusions and we point to several extensions and re￿nements of our results.
2. A Review of the Literature
Of course this is not the ￿rst paper to investigate what determines legal protection; in
particular, the previous literature has put forward two competing explanations: legal origins
and politics.
6
La Porta et al. (1997) show that differences in legal protection are related to the legal
family to which a country belongs: namely, civil law systems seem to grant less protection
compared with common law systems. La Porta et al. (1999) explain this ￿nding with
the circumstance that in common law countries property rights were already protected and
recognized in the early stages of economic development: this tradition translated naturally into
betterinvestorrightslateron. Johnsonetal. (2000)focusinsteadondifferencesinenforcement
mechanisms: as common law systems are mainly case-based, common law judges are given
more discretionary power, and they use this power to detect and punish more effectively
investor expropriation.
While differences in legal origins seem to ￿t well with cross-country differences in
investor protection, they cannot explain changes in a country’s level of investor protection,
like the ones documented by Rajan and Zingales (2003). Two recent papers (Pagano and
Volpin, 2005, Rajan and Zingales, 2003) argue that investor protection is not the heritage of
ancient institutional vicissitudes, but the outcome of ongoing political struggles.
7 In this light
6 See La Porta et al. (2000), Beck et al. (2001) and Pagano and Volpin (2001) for useful surveys.
7 Roe (1994) also looks at the political con￿icts that shaped the US system of corporate governance, but
he concentrates on the pro-market, anti-monopoly ideology which distinguishes American politics. We instead11
it becomes crucial to understand what the relevant political con￿icts are and what actors are
involved, as well as what features of the political system are more important in determining the
outcome of these con￿icts. Pagano and Volpin (2005) focus on the ￿rm-level con￿ict among
outside investors, managers and workers. They argue that managers and workers can form a
political coalition at the expense of investors, which translates into less investor protection
but higher employment protection and higher bene￿ts from control.
8 Rajan and Zingales
(2003) and Hellwig (1999) suggest that the industry-level con￿ict which opposes industrial
and ￿nancial incumbents to outsiders can be relevant as well. While we think that both lines
of research are promising and that they are to a large extent complementary, in this paper
we try to build what is -to our knowledge- the ￿rst formal model that tries to spell out the
links between legal investor protection and the economic and political features of the insider-
outsider con￿ict.
9
Our paper is also related to a recent strand of literature that tries to assess empirically the
role of non-legal istitutions as an alternative source of investor protection. Among others, Stulz
andWilliamson(2003)andCoffee(2001)￿ndthatfactorssuchasreligion, ethniccomposition,
and moral norms go some way towards explaining differences in ￿nancial development. Dyck
and Zingales (2001) in turn show the explanatory role played by the diffusion of newspapers.
The growing awareness of the social and cultural embededness of ￿nance is certainly good
news, but one should also avoid the risk of theoretical indeterminacy: the temptation to
conclude that, after all, ￿anything matters￿. We think that one advantage of our approach
is that it is able to reconcile these recent empirical ￿ndings with the law and ￿nance paradigm.
Indeed, non-legal factors in our model do not matter per se but only insofar as they shape
focus on the incentives faced by self-interested and rational policy-makers. Perotti and Von Thadden (2001) build
a political economy model to explain another prominent difference between ￿nancial systems: the one between
bank-centered and market-centered systems.
8 Furthermore, in Pagano and Volpin the political success or failure of the various groups depends on un-
modeled ideological differences between groups. We focus instead on the amount of resources on which the
interest groups can rely: these resources are in turn a function of the underlying stucture of the economy. On
top of this, while Pagano and Volpin model politics as a voting game in a two-party democracy, in most of the
analysis we abstract from institutional details to concentrate on the overall "quality" of political institutions (a
similar approach is, among others, advocated by Mulligan et al., 2004). In Section 6 we show that our framework
encompasses the political systems studied by Pagano and Volpin.
9 We came to know Perotti and Volpin (2004) after a ￿rst version of this essay had been completed. While
their basic intuition is similar to ours they concentrate on a different economic setting and model the political
game in a different way. More importantly, they do not study the interactions between capital market and labour
market regulations.12
political competition and the relative strength of the competing interest groups. Politics is
not only the main determinant of legal protection, but also the main channel through which
non-legal factors in￿uence the effectiveness of national corporate governance mechanisms.
Williamson (1969) is the ￿rst paper to highlight the anti-competitive effects of high wage
rates. He discusses a Supreme Court decision in which it is pointed out that an agreement
among established employers to raise wages in order to disadvantage newcomers can be seen
as a violation of antitrust laws. Williamson shows that such behaviour can be rational on the
part of the incumbents if they use a technology that is less labour-intensive than that of the
outsiders. This result has since been generalized by Salop and Scheffman (1983) to the case
in which both the incumbents and the entrants share the same technology. While making the
more general point that binding, publicly observable contracts with a third party can be an
effective entry-deterrence tool, Dewatripont (1987, 1988) also argues that clauses protecting
employees can be good for incumbent ￿rms. He also stresses that such contracts are useful
only to the extent that their enforcement is a credible out-of-equilibrium threat (incidentally,
this point lends support to our assumption that labour law matters: legal rules, contrary to
private agreements, cannot be re-negotiated ex post by the parties).
3. The Economic Model
Consider an economy populated by a set N of individuals with identical utility functions,








where " > 1 (the speci￿cation of the utility function is not crucial, but it makes calculations
much easier). The population is divided in turn into two subgroups: entrepreneurs and a
large number of consumers. In this section we investigate the impact of different degrees
of investor protection on the welfare of the different categories, which in turn shapes their
political preferences.
3.1 Consumers
If an agent belongs to the subset Nc ￿ N of consumers (from now on lower case letters
will stand for the cardinality of the correspondent sets, e.g. jNcj ￿ nc), he has nominal wealth
Ac; and chooses consumption to maximize utility, given the budget constraint: pq + W ￿ Ac.13
Thanks to the isoelastic speci￿cation, the solution to the consumer’s maximization problem




Optimal consumption is the same for both consumers and entrepreneurs.
10 The crucial
difference between a consumer and an entrepreneur is that only the latter can manage a ￿rm,
which is in turn represented by a very simple technology: with a ￿xed cost I and with constant
marginal costs equal to one, it is possible to produce one unit of the consumption good. This
implies that if an entrepreneur’s wealth is equal to Aj he needs an amount I-Aj of external
￿nance to cover the entry costs.
Let there be a subgroup Nr ￿ Ne ￿ N=Nc of ￿rich￿ entrepreneurs, each of them
endowed with an amount Ar of money, and a subgroup Np ￿Ne=Nr of ￿poor￿ entrepreneurs,
endowed with wealth Ap < Ar: As to the size of the different subgroups, we take for granted
that nc is so large that consumers take prices as given in both the ￿nancial and the goods
markets. To make the problem interesting we make the following restrictions:
Condition 1 Ap < I
Condition 2 nrAr + npAp + ncAc > Ine
In words: even if poor entrepreneurs need to borrow in order to start up their activity
(Condition 1), in the economy as a whole there are potentially enough resources to meet the
￿nancial needs of the entrepreneurs (Condition 2).
3.3 Product Market Competition
Those entrepreneurs that have enough funds to open a ￿rm choose simultaneously and
non-cooperatively their quantities in order to maximize pro￿ts.
11 The equilibrium price level
10 We are implicitly assuming that even if entrepreneurs can in￿uence prices by varying the quantity of the
good they produce, they do not try to in￿uence prices by changing their demand as consumers. This is quite
realistic as long as the number of entrepreneurs is small with respect to the number of consumers.
11 As will become apparent, the assumption of Cournot competition in the product market is disposable.







where m is the number of ￿rms in the industry; individual gross pro￿ts and individual pro￿ts
net of entry costs are given respectively by :
R(m) =
n(m" ￿ 1)"￿1




Condition 3 ￿(ne) > 0
That is, poor entrepreneurs, if given the possibility, are willing to enter the market, as
they would earn positive pro￿ts.
3.4 Corporate Governance
As remarked before, would-be entrepreneurs need to borrow the difference between I
(the sunk entry costs) and their personal wealth if they want to open a ￿rm. In this subsection
we describe the ￿nancing game between potential lenders, under the hypothesis that the
personal wealth of each entrepreneur can be observed at no cost by the consumers/investors,
and we characterize the equilibrium number of producers as a function of the quality of
governance.
We assume that the ￿rm’s returns are partially non-veri￿able, so the entrepreneur can
appropriate a fraction of revenues up to (1-￿)R, where the parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] is determined
by the law and is taken to represent the degree of investor protection, and the expropriation
decision is not contractable, so the entrepreneur will ex post divert resources up to (1-￿)R(m):
The extreme discontinuity of the expropriation technology avaliable to the entrepreneur, and
the assumption that ￿ is completely determined by the legal environment, are both unrealistic;
however, this framework (which is reminescent of Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, and Tirole,
2001) captures the essence of the legal approach to corporate governance: the relationship
between outside investors and ￿rm’s insiders is hindered by an agency problem that neither
private contracting nor reputational mechanisms can fully solve. This implies that the agents15
must rely on the rights that the law assigns to investors if they want to limit expropriation by
the insiders.
The market for funds it also modelled in a very stylized way: each j2 Ne is matched with
a group of Nj
c consumers, collectively endowed with enough resources to cover start-up costs.
After the match, entrepreneurs choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively the amount Bj
of funds to ask from investors and a promised rate of return rj. Having observed the proposed
contracts (Bj;rj)j2Ne consumers simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether, and
how much, to lend. Individual rationality requires that an investor k2 Nj








k is k’s forecast of the revenues that j will enjoy if he is allowed to produce. R
exp
k
depends in turn upon k’s beliefs about other investors’ choices, summarized by a probability
distribution on Ne
13.
We restrict our attention to "serious" contracts, i.e. contracts for which Bj ￿ I ￿ Aj
and rj ￿ 1 (indeed, it is easy to see that all the other offers are weakly dominated); besides,
we also need to impose some restrictions on investors’ beliefs in order to pin down the market
outcome. However, it turns out that under very mild conditions one is able to completely
characterize the outcomes of the ￿nancing game. Indeed, let the following condition hold:
Condition 4 Investors’ beliefs are such that: (i) they all share the same expectations
about entrepreneurial revenues: R
exp
k = Rexp for any k2 Nc; (ii) each of them forecasts
correctly whether the borrower will make the promised repayments or not (i.e. in equilibrium
there are no defaults); (iii) they coordinate on the equilibrium with the maximum number of
￿nanced ￿rms, compatible with points (i) and (ii).
It can then be proved that:
12 We make the simplifying assumption that if the constraint holds as an equality, the investor stands ready
to lend all the money he has. The way in which the overall borrowing requirement is divided between lenders in






R(m)￿k(m), with ￿k(m) ￿ 0;
ne P
m=1
￿k(m) = 1. With a large number of con-
sumers/investors, the probability that any single lender is decisive in determining whether an entrepreneur is
￿nanced is negligible. This is why we assume that each investor ignores the impact of his own choices on the
number of ￿rms that are ￿nanced (this line of reasoning is analogous to the one pioneered by Grossman and Hart,
1980).16
Lemma 1
14 An equilibrium for the ￿nancing game exists for any level of ￿: Besides,
there is a one to one relationship between the level of investor rights and the number m of






0 if ￿ < ~ ￿
nr if ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
ne if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(3)
Lemma 1 delivers the important economic insight that an ineffective corporate
governance acts as a barrier to entry. Indeed, when there are a lot of ￿rms in the industry
individual returns arelower; evenif ￿rms still enjoypositive pro￿ts, entrepreneurs cancredibly
pledge to the borrowers only a fraction ￿ of total returns. As a result, poor entrepreneurs get
funds only if ￿ is high enough. Simple as it is, we will see that this fact can have big economic
and political consequences.
3.5 Policy Preferences
We have just shown that ￿ determines the number of active ￿rms: in particular, a
higher (lower) degree of investor protection makes product market competition harder (softer).
Suppose now that two different corporate governance regimes can be chosen , a "good" one in
which expropriation is limited, characterized by a level of ￿ equal to ￿h, and a "bad" one in
which ￿ = ￿l, and let the following condition hold true:
Condition 5 ~ ￿ < ￿
l
< ￿ ￿ < ￿
h
As we have already derived the equilibrium price level as a function of m (equation
2) and the demand schedule of the generic individual (equation 1), we can write the indirect
utilities of the different kinds of agents as a function of ￿, in order to assess the effect of
changes in the policy variable on their economic welfare:
Lemma 2 (i) Total pro￿ts are reduced by an improved investor protection; (ii) Both
consumers and poor entrepreneurs are better off with a high level of investor protection; as
14 All propositions are proved in the Appendix.17
long as Nr is not a singleton, the rich entrepreneurs are worst off, too;
15 (iii) The overall effect
on social welfare
U(￿) ￿ ncUc(￿) + npUp(￿) + nrUr(￿)
of an increased investor protection is in principle ambiguous: U(￿h) can be greater, equal or
higher than U(￿l) depending on the parameter values. In particular, U(￿h) > U(￿l) when
nc is large, and I is small.
Point (i) and point (ii) of the lemma are quite intuitive: consumers bene￿t from better
corporate governance because it enables more ￿rms to enter the market and the increased
competition lowers prices. The poor entrepreneurs bene￿t even more from a high ￿ because
it gets their project ￿nanced. At the same time increased competition hurts the incumbents
because it cuts their pro￿ts, and this negative effect more than offsets the positive effect on
their consumption expenditure. Taken together, points (i) and (ii) deliver the main result of this
subsection: incumbents will oppose reforms to improve the quality of the national corporate
gonvernance system, whatever the effect of these reforms on the overall social welfare, as poor
investor protection is for them a shelter from competition.
The rest of this subsection will be devoted to point (iii) which is perhaps less transparent.
Indeed a high ￿ has a positive impact on overall welfare because it allows the "poor"
entrepreneurs to enter the market, so prices go down and overall production goes up. But
at the same time each ￿rm now produces a smaller amount of total output, and this implies
(due to the presence of the ￿xed cost I) higher average costs. As has been noted in the
industrial organization literature (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston, 1986), uncoordinated entry in
an oligopolistic market can lead to a suboptimally high number of ￿rms. Weak corporate
governance can then be seen as a third-best policy from an ef￿ciency point of view, in those
situations in which the regulator cannot ￿x either the price or the exact number of entrants.
This is more likely to be the case when the number of potential entrepreneurs is large compared
with consumers and when sunk costs are high. We think that this side effect of a high degree
of investor protection is interesting per se and it would be useful to assess whether it is robust
15 In theappendix we demostratethat even in theextreme case inwhich nr = 1 the resultholds true, provided
" is not too small (in particular, a suf￿cient condition is that " > 1 + 1
nc). Intuitively, one needs this restriction
because, with a single producer, " ! 1+ implies that p(1)= "
"￿1 ! +1 so that the consumption of the good goes
to 0. In turn, this entails the monopolist’s stake as a consumer becoming predominant over its corporate interests
(indeed, its utility from consumption becomes log(q) and the marginal utility of consumption goes to in￿nity).
We exclude such con￿gurations as implausible (as nc is large) and uninteresting.18
to different modelling assumptions. Besides, it makes it even more likely that in equilibrium a
low level of ￿ will be chosen. However, putting ourselves in the worst possible position, we
try to demostrate that a poor corporate governance can arise even when it is unambiguously
harmful for social welfare. So, in the following, we will restrict ourselves to the case in which
U(￿h) ￿ U(￿l) > 0:
4. The Political Model
The indirect utility functions of the agents, as summarized in lemma 2, determine
their policy preferences, which are clearly divergent: incumbent entrepreneurs prefer lower
investor protection (which acts for them as a shelter from competition), whereas consumers
and entrant entrepreneurs prefer high investor protection. Which group will get its way?
It obviously depends on the speci￿c assumptions about how the political system aggregates
individual preferences into a collective choice about ￿. Given that good corporate governance
is bene￿cial overall , a benevolent politician would of course implement it. Unfortunately, the
public choice and the political economy literature have argued convincingly (if needed) that
textbook pigouvian policy-makers are more the exception than the rule. So we assume that
politicans are, at least to some extent, self-interested.
The second crucial assumption that we make about politics is that people can in￿uence
political outcomes not only voting at elections but also through the initiatives and actions of
organized interest groups. Self-interested politicians, when taking decisions, pay attention not
only to social welfare but also to the interests of organized groups and lobbies, so that in the
end the preferences of some citizens (those that happen to belong to some powerful lobby) are
more politically relevant than the preferences of others. Of course, good political institutions
aim to mitigate the agency problem between citizens and politicians and to minimize the power
of organized special interests. In this and in the following sections we will show how different
political institutions determine the winners and losers in the con￿ict that opposes industry
insiders to the rest of the population with regard to corporate governance. In this chapter we
assume the existence of an incumbent policy-maker who is free to choose the policy he prefers:
elections and democratic checks and balances are left on the background. In the next chapter
we will instead explicity take elections and electoral incentives into account.19
Suppose that the political choice is about the level of ￿ 2
￿
￿h;￿l￿
. Of course one could
ask from the start: why do we assume away other more direct barriers to entry? Following
Rajan and Zingales (2003), a ￿rst answer is that indirectly restricting entry through ￿nancial
markets is far less costly, from a political point of view, than imposing overt barriers to entry.
As corporate governance seems not a crucial issue in the day-by-day political mayhem or in
pre-electoral debates a politician can disguise more easily his political deal with the economic
establishment. Besides, restricting entry through corporate governance can be really ef￿cient
(you do not need an ongoing policing activity to keep the borders of the market safe: investors
will do the job for you) and effective (e.g. you do not have to be afraid that a slighly different
product or production process may void your red tape barriers). On the other hand, we really
view ￿nancial barriers to entry as a possible complement, not a substitute, for other forms of
restrictions (like the ones surveyed in Dyankov et al., 2002).
4.1 Lobbies
We also suppose that both ￿rich￿ entrepreneurs and ￿poor￿ entrepreneurs are organized
into lobbies (respectively lobby R and lobby P) whereas consumers are not.
What social groups are more easily organized in a pressure group and how they manage
to solve the free riding problem is still an open and debated question. Typically, we observe
hard lobbying when the special interest group is small and the stake in the political issue is big
(Olson, 1965). Consumers are a large and widely dispersed group, so each of them has a strong
temptation to free ride. Besides, each of them stands to gain relatively little by contributing
to the common struggle, so overall it seems plausible (and in line with previous contributions)
not to see them as a powerful interest group.
We adopt a common agency framework of the kind ￿rst studied by Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986 (an early application of this model to economic policy-making is Grossman
and Helpman, 1994) in which active lobbies try to in￿uence politicians by promising them
valuable monetary resources.
16
16 Of course, straight monetary transfers are not the only way through which lobbies gain political power.
A comprehensive exposition of the role and effects of organized interest groups is provided by Grossman and
Helpman (2001).20
Lobby R and lobby P submit two contribution schedules (here couples of non-negative
real numbers (CR(￿h);CR(￿l));(CP(￿h);CP(￿l))) to the politician in order to maximize the






Cj(￿) j = R;P;
where we de￿ne ￿R(￿) ￿ ￿(m(￿)), ￿P(￿l) ￿ 0, ￿P(￿h) ￿ ￿(ne) and assume that
members of a lobby share equally the costs of lobbying.
4.2 The Policy-maker
A single individual (or a cohesive political establishment) has the authority to set ￿: His
objective function is given by:




where ￿ ￿ 0 wants to capture the extent to which the policy-maker internalizes the welfare of
the polity. It can be seen as the degree of policy-maker’s benevolence as well as a summary
parameter that depends on the ex post accountability, through elections or other democratic
institutions, of incumbent politicians (as we will see better in the next section). Given the
contribution schedules, the politician decides the level of ￿: After his decision, the ￿nancing
choices are made and ￿nally the promised contributions are payed.
4.3 Political Equilibrium
We are looking for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (￿￿;(C￿
j(￿k))j=R;P;k=h;l) of the
lobbying game. To rule out implausible equilibria we concentrate, following the literature, on
￿truthful￿subgameperfectNashequilibria, whosepropertiesareinvestigatedbyBernheimand
Whinston (1986).
17 These are SPNE in which lobbies use ￿truthful￿ contribution schedules, in
the sense that the difference between the two offers is equal to the corresponding difference in
the gross pay-off levels: j￿￿jj = j￿Cjj; provided Cj(￿) ￿ ￿j(￿); for j=R,P. In other words,
17 See also Dixit et al. (1997). As a matter of fact, in the simple setup of this chapter, truthful equilibria co-
incide with those equilibria in which players do not play weakly dominated strategies, as the proof of proposition
1 below makes clear. The same is true for proposition 2, in Section 6.5.21
we have:






j ￿ 0: It turns out that there exists a unique truthful SPNE. Moreover, the equilibrium
outcome depends crucially on ￿ :
Proposition 1 There is a threshold ￿ ￿ > 0 such that if ￿ > ￿ ￿; the only truthful SPNE
outcome has ￿￿ = ￿h; and if ￿ < ￿ ￿; the only truthful SPNE outcome has ￿￿ = ￿l18.
The moral of the story is quite crude: if the politician does not suf￿ciently internalize the
welfare of the citizenship (if political institutions do not provide an adequate level of ex post
accountability) the country will be left with a backward governance regime (and a subotimal
levelofproduction). Theeconomicandpoliticalestablishmentwillstrikeamutuallybene￿cial
deal at the expense of the rest of the population. The mechanics that lead to this result are also
straightforward: as potential allies the entrants are less interesting for the politician. The
higher competition that they would bring into the market would destroy pro￿ts, so they have
less to offer in the political bargaining stage. Conversely, the rich can pledge a greater amount
of prospective resources, conditionally on being left undisturbed in the market. Therefore, in
those countries in which politicians are not subject to effective popular oversight, incumbents
will succeed in tilting policy in their favour.
5. Complicating the Economic Environment: Investor Protection and the Regulation of
Labour
Weak investor protection need not be the only instrument used by incumbents to keep
potential competitors out of the market. In this section we argue that labour laws can be
used as a barrier to entry as well, and that under certain conditions incumbents will lobby
to introduce pro-worker legislation. Corporate governance and labour laws can be seen as
complementary institutions, as they move in the same direction in response to exogenous
changes in the political environment. The intuition is that both weak investor protection and
pro-worker legislation reduce the money that producers can credibly pledge to creditors ex
post, therefore making it more dif￿cult for them to raise funds ex ante.
18 In the threshold case in which ￿ = ￿ ￿, both outcomes are possible.22
To study these interactions, let us enrich our economic framework: consider now an
economy in which in order to produce 1 unit of the good an entrepreneur needs 1 unit of labour,
and in which consumers are also workers and supply labour at a utility cost of 1 for each hour
of work, so that in equilibrium the labour market clears with a wage equal to 1. In such a
framework, unit costs and pro￿ts are identical to the ones derived in Section 3 and therefore
all those results go through without changes. Suppose, however, that politicians can implement
a package of policy measures that tilt the intra￿rm distribution of rents in favour of workers.
Labour market institutions are complex and multi-dimensional, ranging from minimum wage
legislation to the rules regulating collective bargaining, to hiring and ￿ring restrictions, all of
which indirectly determine the wages accruing to workers; we take a shortcut and assume that
politicians have the option of directly setting wage rates at any level w￿1.















(where prices and revenues depend now both on the number of competitors and on w). As
a consequence, the number of active ￿rms also depends on both sets of rules. In particular,






w"￿1 < ~ ￿
nr if ￿ ￿ > ￿
w"￿1 ￿ ~ ￿
ne if ￿
w"￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿
The political choice becomes two-dimensional as well, involving a couple (￿;w) with ￿ 2
￿
￿h;￿l￿
and w ￿ 1: Overall welfare is maximized by the "pro-market" package (￿h;1).
Indeed, foranylevel of ￿, forsocietyas awholeitisoptimal toavoidlabourmarketdistortions
and to set w=1. If employment is concentrated among a small set of workers/consumers, these
"insiders" may prefer high wages, provided they are high enough to compensate them for the
induced higher prices. However, the gains enjoyed by such inside workers are exactly offset
by the losses incurred by their employers: in the aggregate, the only effect of high wages is
19 To be completely rigorous, w has to be restricted to an at most numerable set of values: 1,1+￿;1 + 2￿;:::
for some ￿ > 0; to grant that the choice set of the agents is closed. However, as ￿ can be taken to be as small as
one wishes, we can disregard this assumption in the exposition.23
to induce higher prices and thus lower consumption, both directly (by raising marginal costs)
and indirectly, by making entry impossibile for poor entrepreneurs.
20 As a result, from a social
point of view (￿;w0) is (strictly) preferred to (￿;w00) for any ￿ and for any w0 ￿ w
00 (resp.
w0 < w
00). In turn, for any level of w, (￿h;w) is preferred to (￿l;w), where the preferences
must be understood to be strict in those cases in which m(￿h;w) 6= m(￿l;w). It follows
that when organized lobbies are absent, or when the decision is taken by a fully benevolent
social planner, (￿h;1) is implemented.
21 It also follows from this discussion that the poor
entrepreneurs’ lobby will also favour the "pro-market" set of rules.
With regard to the policy preferences of the rich entrepreneurs’ lobby, it has to be noted
that pro-worker laws reduce insiders’ rents as well, so that high wages represent a particularly
expensive barrier to entry. This implies that lobby R will prefer w=1 as well, unless two
necessary conditions are met: (i) weak investor protection is not enough per se to prevent
entry; (ii) the minimum level of w which discourages entry is not so high that a higher degree
of product market competition reduces overall pro￿ts less than the redistribution of corporate
rents due to the empowerment of labour.
22 Stated formally, a necessary condition for w> 1 to
be an equilibrium outcome is the following:
Condition 50 (i) ￿l ￿ ￿ ￿; (ii) ￿l < ￿ ￿[
nrR(nr;1)
neR(ne;1)￿npI]
It turns out that if political checks and balances on the policy-maker are not strong
enough, condition 5’ is not only necessary but also suf￿cient to observe a high wage/bad
governance equilibrium:
20 This also implies that there is no need to spell out the rules of the matching of workers and ￿rms in the
labour market.
21 For some parameter values there are indeed wage levels for which neither the people nor the policy-maker
care about ￿: That is because in such cases w is so high (resp. so low) that m(￿h;w) = m(￿l;w) = nr (resp.
m(￿h;w) = m(￿l;w) = ne) and because in our simple framework corporate governance is nothing but a barrier
to entry. For simplicity’s sake, in such circumstances we will focus on the equilibria in which ￿ = ￿h:





Proposition 10 There is a unique threshold ￿ ￿ > 0 and a unique wh > 1 such that if
￿ > ￿ ￿;(￿h;1) is the truthful SPNE outcome; if ￿ < ￿ ￿;(￿l;wh) is the truthful SPNE outcome.
23
Proposition 10 then formalizes the idea that strong investor protection is associated with
￿exible labour markets and that both rely on the quality of political institutions; political
reforms that align the objectives of the policy-makers with those of society (in the model,
an increase in ￿ from below to above the threshold) will trigger economic liberalization in
both the labour and the ￿nancial markets.
6. Complicating the Political Environment: Electoral Competition
To sum up, if one wants to ￿nd the causes of a country’s ￿nancial underdevelopment, one
should look at the workings of the national political system. To defeat the vested interests and
enhance corporate governance a country needs institutions that guarantee a high congruence
between policy outcomes and social preferences.
Of course, the main instrument people have to keep politicians on their toes is elections,
sointhissectionweputelectoralcompetitionatthecentre-stagetoseehowandwhenelections
provide politicians with the right incentives to overlook the organized interest groups and enact
welfare-enhancing ￿nancial reforms.
We use a version of the voting model developed by Baron (1994) and extended by
Grossman and Helpman (1996)
24 to argue that the effectiveness of elections in disciplining
politicians cannot be taken for granted and crucially depends on the broad social and political
characteristics of a country. The driving force here is the assumption that agents, when voting,
are of two different kinds: informed and uninformed. Uninformed voters are not aware of the
importance of corporate governance for their own well-being. Besides, they can be in￿uenced
by campaign spending, in the form of political advertising or whatever, which has in turn
to be funded by the contributions of lobbies. This implies that, when choosing electoral
platforms, candidates face a fundamental trade-off: by putting in their agenda a package of
23 In the threshold case in which ￿ = ￿ ￿, both outcomes are possible.
24 The main simpli￿cation we introduce with respect to Grossman Helpman (1996) is given by the different
timing. In their model contributions are decided before, not after, political positions are set. This implies that
lobbies can use their contributions to in￿uence both the electoral outcomes and the electoral platforms.25
pro-market measures they can attract votes from the (majority of) the well-informed portion of
the electorate. On the other hand, if they sweep reforms under the carpet they will be rewarded
by the incumbent’s lobby with valuable resources that can be used to in￿uence the voting of
the uninformed and impressionable voters. In what follows we spell out the extensive form of
the electoral game and characterize the equilibrium level of the relevant policy variables.
6.1 Candidates
Let there be two candidates (or cohesive political parties), say A and B. Each candidate
has a ￿xed ideological position that cannot be credibly changed, but each of them can freely
and credibly choose a vector of policy variables ￿ to be implemented if he wins the elections.
The ideological position of a candidate can summarize a set of exogenous characteristics of the
politician (e.g. ability) and, more generally, all those political issues that are either (perceived
as) orthogonal to ￿ or as not manipulable by the candidates. Candidates are of￿ce seekers:
they maximize the probability of winning the elections. We will ￿rst explore the implications
of the model when the only policy to be chosen is the level of investor protection ￿: As in real
world politics issues come in bundles, we will subsequently enrich the framework to account
for the simultaneous determination of ￿ and w.
6.2 Lobbies
Once the candidates have chosen their preferred ￿, lobbies can in￿uence the electoral



















B)] j = R;P
where PA is the probability that party A wins the elections. PA is of course endogenous and
we will see immediately how it depends on the candidates’ choices and on the contributions.
Finally, one should note that (unlike in Section 4), in order to be helpful in the political
struggle, contributions must be handled before the elections. To avoid unnecessary clutter,
we assume that lobbies are not credit-constrained, so that they can borrow from the market26
the resources that they channel to the parties and give the money back after production and
consumption has taken place.
25
6.3 Informed Voters
Informed voters represent a fraction ￿ of the electorate.
26 When casting their ballot, they
evaluate both the ideological position and the policy platform of the candidates. So a generic
informed voter i of group j=C,R,P votes for party A if and only if Uj(￿A) > Uj(￿B) + bij,
where bij measures the net ideological preference of i for party B. We abstract from cross-
group differences in the ideological bias for B, assuming that it is distributed identically across
different groups in the population, as a uniform distribution with mean b/f and density f. Here f
is inversely related to the strength of ideological preferences in the population: a low level of f
implies that a larger fraction of the electorate entertains extreme ideological views. Therefore,
















Following Grossman and Helpman (2001) and the literature on probabilistic voting we
further assume that candidates are uncertain about the true value of b, and they perceive it as
drawn by a distribution Fb; uniform with mean 0 and density ￿.
28
6.4 Uninformed Voters
The fraction (1-￿) of uninformed voters, when voting, does not evaluate the potential
consequences of each of the two the policy platforms. They just care about the ideological
position of the candidates and, on the top of this, they are in￿uenced by campaign spending.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1996), we assume that the fraction of informed voters that is
25 As is clear from the proofs of propositions 2 and 20 below, this assumption is not crucial: what is needed
is for lobby R to be able to mobilize a greater amount of resources than lobby P before elections.
26 We abstract from differences in the percentage of uninformed people across the different economic groups.
27 Following the literature (e.g. Stromberg, 2004), we simplify the exposition disregarding the idiosyncratic
individual-level uncertainty. The approximation error is negligible as long as nc is suf￿ciently large.
28 One could have alternatively hypothesized that parties maximize their vote share, while knowing the exact
value of b (Grossman and Helpman, 1996).27














P for q=A,B and e is a parameter that captures the ef￿ciency of
the technology which transforms campaign contributions into electoral consensus. Implicit in
this reduced-form speci￿cation is the idea that, without campaign contributions, the relative
popularity of the parties is the same for the two kinds of voters.
6.5 Political Equilibrium when ￿ = ￿
We are now in a position to say something about the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium




j=R;P): In particular, the main result of this
section is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 De￿ne ￿ ￿
￿f
(1￿￿)e: There is a unique threshold ￿ ￿ such that if ￿ < ￿ ￿;
￿A￿ = ￿B￿ = ￿l is the only truthful equilibrium outcome of the election game, and if ￿ > ￿ ￿
the equilibrium has ￿A￿ = ￿B￿ = ￿h (￿ ￿ > 0; provided ￿ is suf￿ciently large). Furthermore,
C
q￿
j is always zero in equilibrium for each j and q
30.
What is the main intuition behind this result? First note that the expected percentage of
votes earned by party A is given by the weighted sum of sI
A and sU









￿ b + ￿f
U(￿A) ￿ U(￿B)
n
+ (1 ￿ ￿)e(C
A ￿ C
B):
So the probability of party A winning when n is large is given by:






+ (1 ￿ ￿)e(C
A ￿ C
B)): (6)
29 We are implicitly taking for granted that f and e are small enough (and ￿ is large enough) for sI
A and sU
A
to fall between 0 and 1 for any feasible policy option.
30 If ￿ = ￿ ￿; both the equilibria exist.28
When both parties know that lobbies’ contributions will be zero, they will both choose
￿h; the welfare-maximizing policy, so that PA = Fb(0): For this not to be an equilibrium, it is
necessary that if parties deviate from the welfare-maximizing policy they should be adequately
rewarded by lobby R through campaign contributions; at the same time, lobby R will ￿nd it
worthwile to spend money on a political party that endorses ￿l only if contributions are an







￿A=￿B;CA=CB = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)e be big enough. Equation 6 also implies that











for q=A,B, which is equal to the objective function that we assumed in the post-election model
of Sections 4 and 5, save that we now have that ￿ =
￿f
(1￿￿)e.
Equation7 isimportantformany reasons, besidesbeingthe keytoproving proposition2.
First, itshowsclearlythetrade-offbetweenwelfareandcontributionsfacedbybothcandidates.
As we anticipated above, electoral competition is per se a force that pushes candidates towards
welfare maximizing policies. On the other hand, to the extent that campaign rethoric has an
appeal for a signi￿cant fraction of the voting population, tilting platforms towards the lobbies’
desiderata is tempting, because it provides candidates with resources to invest in campaign
messages. We demostrate in the appendix that the economic asimmetry between the two
competing interest groups (which we have already discussed at length) leads to a political
asymmetry so that the incumbent’s lobby is always privileged.
Equation 7 also explains what factors in￿uence the relative importance of the two forces:
1) A large percentage of informed voters on the total population should be associated
with high investor protection. Not only does this reinforce the intuition of Pagano and Volpin
that a widespread ￿equity culture￿ is important for the development of the ￿nancial sector;
it can be also seen to rationalize recent empirical ￿ndings (Dyck and Zingales, 2001) of
a positive impact of well-functioning media on a country’s corporate governance. While
informal explanations of the corporate governance role of the media have focused on a direct
effect of information on the incentives of managers (Dyck and Zingales, 2002), we highlight29
here an indirect effect, which works through the disciplining effect of the media on political
actors.
2) If ideological preferences are very strong, investor protection will be low. This is
a new and potentially testable implication of our analysis. It is also quite intuitive: voters
in countries that are swept by harsh political and ideological con￿icts obviously care less
about the parties’ positions on such ￿technical￿ issues. Then politicians have more room to
engage in political bargaining with in￿uential interest groups at a reduced political cost. Deep
ideological, ethnolinguistic and cultural divides have already been associated in the empirical
literature with ￿nancial underdevelopment (Coffee, 2001), Stulz and Williamson, 2003). Here
we provide a new rationale for these ￿ndings, to the extent that social cleavages translate into
political ones. We think that the cultural variables used so far could be seen as a proxy for
more precise measures of what political scientists call the ￿political culture￿ of a country and
that more empirical investigation along these lines could be fruitful.
6.6 Political Equilibrium when ￿ = (￿;w)
The results of the last section go through almost unchanged in the case in which the
political struggle is not only about corporate governance but also about the condition of labour.
Indeed, provided condition 50 holds, one can demonstrate the following:
Proposition 20 There is a unique threshold ￿ ￿ such that if ￿ < ￿ ￿; ￿A￿ = ￿B￿ = ￿l and
wA￿ = wB￿ = wh is the only truthful equilibrium outcome of the election game, and if ￿ > ￿ ￿
the equilibrium has ￿A￿ = ￿B￿ = ￿h;wA￿ = wB￿ = 1 (￿ ￿ > 0; provided ￿ is suf￿ciently
large). Furthermore, C
q
j is always zero in equilibrium for each j and q.
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6.7 Electoral Rules
As we gave a ￿rst look into the black box of the political process, we saw that several
socio-political characteristics of a country can in￿uence the equilibrium level of legal investor
protection through their impact on the electoral competition. From a normative point of view
one could be disappointed to recognize that "soft" or informal elements of the political system
31 Again, if ￿ = ￿ ￿; both the equilibria exist.30
are so important, because they seem quite dif￿cult and slow to change. It would be interesting
to see whether different formal political institutions per se, other things being equal, can
generate differences in ￿: One easy step to take in this direction is to look at the impact
of different electoral rules.
32
Suppose that the country is divided into 3 different electoral districts, 1, 2 and 3. To
concentrate on politics, supose also that they have the same economic composition and the
same population. The only difference is in the direction and the strength of the ideological
preferences. For instance, let district 1 be ideologically biased toward party A: the ideological
preferences of the population of district 1 are distributed as a uniform of mean -(b+l)/f1
and density f1where l>0, and let district 2 be ideologically biased toward party B, with the
ideological preferences of the population distributed as a uniform of mean (b+l)/f3 and density
f3: In addition, suppose that l is so big that, whatever ￿A;￿B are, the majority of votes of
district 1 will go to party A and the majority of votes of district 3 will go to party B. District
2’s ideological preferences can instead by summarized by a uniform distribution of mean b/f2
and density f2: District 2 is taken to be not only the more ￿moderate￿ district, but also the more
homogeneous one from an ideological point of view: f1 < f2;f3 < f2:
Now suppose the electoral rule is proportional, i.e. to win a party needs a vote share
greater than 1/2 of the population. Following the same steps as in Section 4, candidate q=A,B











with ￿ f = (f1 + f2 + f3)=3:
But now suppose that the electoral rule is majoritarian, so that each candidate wins if he
getsamajorityofvotesintwodistrictsoutofthree(onecanalsointerpretthe3districtsasthree
electoral colleges in a presidential election). This implies that, when choosing their policy
platforms, both candidates completely disregard the 2 extreme districts, so that the electoral
competition takes place only in the ￿marginal￿ district. One can show that now candidate q
maximizes:











Asf2 > ￿ f thisimpliesthat, ceterisparibus, itiseasiertoobserveahighdegreeofinvestor
protection in a majoritarian than in a proportional country: to the extent that majoritarian
voting systems tend to concentrate electoral competition in some marginal district that is
particularly sensitive to policy, the pressure towards policies that are optimal from a utilitarian
point of view becomes stronger.
7. Conclusions
The law and ￿nance approach has had a major impact on our understanding of corporate
governance. While the earlier literature put the emphasis on the comparison between different
￿nancialsystems, theworkofLaPortaandcoauthorshasaskedthemorefundamentalquestion
of why ￿nancial systems differ across the world. The more recent literature has underlined the
importance of legal investor protection in de￿ning the features of ￿nancial systems. However,
the law and ￿nance approach raises a new set of questions: What are the determinants of legal
investor protection? Why are some countries stuck in a situation of poor investor protection?
To answer these questions one needs to understand the workings of the political process.
In this paper we have applied the tools of political economy to understand the evolution (or
the lack thereof) of corporate governance systems. Following Rajan and Zingales (2003), we
have argued that while improvements in legal investor protection are socially desirable, they
harm incumbent entrepreneurs. In fact, better corporate governance law, by facilitating access
to ￿nancing for new entrepreneurs, induces new entry that dissipates the incumbents’ rents.
Incumbents can try to stop the evolution to better corporate governance rules by lobbying
self-interested politicians. We have shown that the equilibrium outcome is shaped by factors
such as the role of the press, the type of electoral competition, the ideological entrenchment
of voters. Our paper is only a preliminary attempt to understand the political economy of
corporate governance. Much remains to be done. First, while we have discussed general
corporate rules, it is interesting to study speci￿c rules and laws. For instance, in an interesting
paper Biais and RØcasens (2002) study the political economy determinants of bankruptcy law.
Second, theincreasingintegrationofcapitalmarketsposesathreattotheincumbents’abilityto
bend the political process in their favour. In fact, ￿rms can decide to migrate to more ￿investor32
friendly￿ legal regimes. For instance, Italian ￿rms may decide to be listed in the NYSE or the
LSE, thereby committing to the tougher corporate governance rules imposed by those stock
exchanges. The possibility of a migration of national ￿rms to more investor friendly regimes
can undermine the ability of incumbents to preserve inef￿cient rules in their country. Some
authors have come to the extreme conclusion that differences in corporate governance will
soon disappear (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000). Although this conjecture seems extreme, it
is nonetheless very interesting to understand how the reduction in mobility barriers impact on
the political decision process. These questions await further research.Appendix










n(ne"￿1)"￿1 > ~ ￿:
Note that condition 1 implies that ￿ ￿ > 0 and condition 3 implies that ￿ ￿ < 1. Condition
4 (i) guarantees that only three kinds of equilibria are possible: equilibria in which all the
entrepreneurs are ￿nanced, equilibria in which all the rich are ￿nanced whereas no poor are
￿nanced, and equilibria in which nobody gets funds. Condition 4 (ii) implies that a necessary
condition for an equilibrium is that all the promises made by borrowers are honoured. Then,
as long as ￿ <~ ￿, the only equilibrium is the one in which no-one is ￿nanced. On the contrary,
if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Condition 4 (ii) is always ful￿lled. So, if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the only equilibrium is the one
in which all the entrepreneurs offer r=1, and investors lend to them enough money to start the
￿rm.
If ~ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ there cannot exist equilibria in which all the borrowers are ￿nanced.
However, there do exist equilibria in which all the rich are ￿nanced (again, they will offer a
unitary interest rate). These are the only ones that comply with Condition 4 (iii).
Lemma 2 Point (i) in the lemma is an obvious consequence of Cournot competition,
and can be ascertained by inspecting the derivative of R(m) for m￿ 1: The ￿rst two statements
under Point (ii) stem from the indirect utility functions of consumers and poor entrepreneurs:















The third statement concerning the welfare of rich entrepreneurs can also be proven by
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Regarding point (iii), note that the change in average social welfare associated with the

























Now the only restriction that we have imposed on I is that Ap < I < R(ne): To demostrate
that ￿U
n can take any sign, one just needs to show that there are admissible parameter
values for which Ap < n
npQ(np;nr;") as well as admissible parameter values for which
n
npQ(np;nr;") < R(ne) = n
nep(ne)￿"(p(ne) ￿ 1): The ￿rst statement is obvious (just take




nr j￿￿Rj ￿ np￿￿P
￿U=n
:
First of all note that ￿ ￿ > 0 by lemma 2 (i). Consider ￿rst the case in which ￿ < ￿ ￿: The
proof of the statement is in two parts. First we demonstrate that in any SPNE ￿￿ = ￿l and
then we show that such an SPNE exists.35
Indeed ￿￿ = ￿h cannot be an equilibrium, as ￿ < ￿ ￿ implies ￿￿U=n < nr j￿￿Rj ￿
np￿￿P i.e that
nr j￿￿Rj > ￿￿U=n + np￿￿P > ￿￿U=n + ￿CP
But then lobby R can deviate and offer a menu of contributions in which CR(￿h) = 0;
and CR(￿l) is such that nr j￿￿Rj > CR(￿l) > ￿CP + ￿￿U=n, which would make their












It is immediate that all of them are in fact SPNEs, with strategies that are truthful with




R = nr￿(nr) ￿ np￿(ne) ￿ ￿￿U=n.























so that total pro￿ts are higher if m=nr and w=wh that if m=ne and w=1. First, one has
to note that if w*, ￿￿, C￿
P(:), C￿
R(:) is a truthful SPNE than it is constrained ef￿cient, in the









































with at least one strict inequality and the politician would choose (w0,￿0) instead of (w￿;￿￿):
This simple fact implies that in equilibrium if w > 1 then w=wh : in fact, if
1 < w < w
h
entry is not deterred and the pro￿ts of both groups as well as social welfare would be greater
with w=1. If w>wh either entry is not deterred or it is, but in this latter case it could be done
more ef￿ciently if the politician chose (￿l;wh): Ef￿ciency also implies that in equilibrium
w=wh only if ￿ = ￿l. So there remain just two candidate equilbrium outcomes: (￿h;1) and
(￿l;wh):
The logic behind the ￿rst part of the proof of proposition 1 applies, provided one re-
de￿nes ￿￿R = R(nr;wh) ￿ R(ne;1) (which incidentally is strictly greater than zero tanks to
condition 3 and conditon 5’ (ii)), ￿￿P = R(ne;1) ￿ I, and ￿U = U(ne;wh) ￿ U(nr;1): as
in the one-dimensional case, (￿h;1) is not an equilibrium if ￿ < ￿ ￿ (condition 5’(ii) guarantees
that in this case too ￿ ￿ > 0): On the other hand, it is immediate to check that if ￿ < ￿ ￿, truthful












constitute an equilbrium, and if this strategies are played, the policy maker chooses (￿￿;w￿) =
(￿l;wh) (indeed, we just need to check that (￿h;1) is not a pro￿table deviation). The case in
which ￿ > ￿ ￿ is symmetric.
Proposition 2 We have to consider three cases:37
￿ ￿(1-￿)enr(￿R(￿l) ￿ ￿R(￿h)) < 1: Suppose that one of the parties chooses ￿h and the
other chooses ￿l: The marginal bene￿t of contributions to the party which choses ￿l for
lobby R and, a fortiori, the marginal bene￿ts of contributions to the party which chooses
￿h for lobby L, are lower than the marginal cost, so the lobbies will never contribute to a
party whatever the electoral platforms. Choosing the social optimum is then a dominant
strategy for both parties. As a consequence, the unique equilibrium has ￿A￿ = ￿B￿ = ￿h.
￿ ￿(1-￿)enr(￿R(￿l) ￿ ￿R(￿h)) > 1 > ￿(1-￿)enp(￿P(￿h) ￿ ￿P(￿l)): the parties know
that if they choose different policies, lobby R will contribute to the party which proposes
￿l, up to the point at which its contribution exhausts all the gains it would enjoy from a
worse corporate governance regime, i.e. up to the point at which its contribution is equal to
nr[￿R(￿l) ￿ ￿R(￿h)]. On the contrary, lobby P will not make contributions in favour of
the party which proposes ￿l, as the marginal bene￿t of doing so is higher than the marginal
cost. Suppose, without loss of generality, that ￿A = ￿l and ￿B = ￿h: The contribution of























+ (1 ￿ ￿)enr(￿R(￿
l) ￿ ￿R(￿
h)]g
If this probability is higher (lower) than one half there is just one equilibrium, in which








So that if ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿
nr(￿R(￿l)￿￿R(￿h))
(U(￿h)￿U(￿l))=n , both parties choose ￿l, while if ￿ > ￿ ￿ both parties
choose ￿h:
￿ ￿(1-￿)enp(￿P(￿h) ￿ ￿P(￿l)) > 1: As before, we have to analyze what happens after the
histories in which the two parties propose different policies (let us consider without loss of38


















The intuition behind the formula is exactly the same as in the previous case, but now the



















The Nash equilibrium of the subgame is found by looking for the point at which the two
best response functions cross. It is easy to see that this point exists and is unique. In particular,
the Nash equilibrium in the subgame depends on ￿: If
￿ ￿
























and A wins with probability 1. If

































which is less that one half if and only if
￿ ￿




























and A loses with probability 1. When it comes to the ￿rst stage of the electoral game,
then, it follows that ￿A￿ = ￿B￿ = ￿l (resp.￿A￿ = ￿B￿ = ￿h) if and only if ￿ is less than
(respectively higher than):
nr[￿R(￿l) ￿ ￿R(￿h)] ￿ np[￿P(￿h) ￿ ￿P(￿l)]
(U(￿h) ￿ U(￿l))=n
:
Proposition 2’: In a truthful SPNE no candidate will ever choose an equilibrium which
is constrained inef￿cient (see the proof of proposition 2 above for the de￿nition of constrained
inef￿ciency). To determine what equilibrium is actually played it is then enough to study
the equilibrium in the subgame among lobbies after the history ((￿l;wh);(￿h;1)): But it is
immediate to see that the steps here are exactly the same as in the proof of proposition 2 once
one substitutes nr[￿R(￿l)￿￿R(￿h)] with nr[￿R(￿l;wh)￿￿R(￿h;1)] ;np[￿P(￿h)￿￿P(￿l)]
with np[￿P(￿h;1) ￿ ￿P(￿l;wh)] and U(￿h) ￿ U(￿l) with U(￿h;1) ￿ U(￿l;wh):References
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